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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of the present investigation is twofold, namely, to
fit early recollections within a broad framework of sociological,
philosophical and psychological thought, and to provide experimental
evidence for the use of early recollections as a valid projective
measure of personality.
A rather platitudinous and yet seemingly accurate assumption
about humans is that they are social beings.

They have always been

imbedded in some sort of interpersonal frame, be it a small hunting
and gathering tribe or a highly advanced and densely populated in
dustrial state.

Social existence, however, does not simply mean that

people live in physical proximity, but in moral proximity as well,
that is, within a system of norms, mores, laws, and so forth.

Although

these social rules perform the essential function of ensuring a rela
tively smooth and predictable pattern of interaction between members,
thereby protecting the integrity of the communal network, they nonethe
less lack a "real" or objective base.

With this respect, the French

sociologist Emile Durkheim (1964), whose works emerged at the turn of
the century, proposed that society is based upon and held together by
a set of beliefs and morals called the collective conscience, which is
shared by the society's members and is a reality to which the people
must conform or else suffer the consequences of ostracism and, in
some cases, out-and-out revenge and retribution.

Perhaps the most

thorough exploration of this subjective and moral base of social reality

1
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was performed in the 1960's by a group of sociologists representing
the Ethnomethodological Theory, which was an application of Durkheim's
general theory to this specific area.

The Ethnomethodologists published

a considerable amount of material on their topic, of which the find
ings of Garfinkel and Berger & Luckman, mentioned below, are repre
sentative.
In his book Garfinkel (1967) presented a number of studies con
cerning the substance of social reality.

His students would violate

simple social rules, such as facing the rear of elevators instead
of the front, haggling over prices in large department stores, and
treating family members as strangers, in an unusually polite and for
mal manner.

The results consistently showed that persons subjected

to the students' transgressions were shocked, confused, and basically
disoriented.

Considering the ease by which his students were able to

play havoc with the social order, Garfinkel concluded that the social
world is a very flimsy construction based on a number of beliefs, ex
pectations, and morals that are accepted without question.
Berger & Luckman (1966) were also aware of the fragile nature of
social reality and emphasized the necessity of everyday conversation in
maintaining it.

Without such conversation, reality, that is, morality

may rapidly dissipate:
"Subjective reality is...always dependent upon specific
plausibility structures, that is, the specific social
base and social processes required for its maintenance.
Disruption of significant conversation with the mediators
of the respective plausibility structures threatens the
realities in question" (p. 142).
Berger & Luckman went on to say that conversational reality-maintenance
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typically occurs at an implicit or preconscious level.

That is, it

does not, in the large majority of cases, directly define reality:
"It is important to stress, however, that the greater
part of reality-maintenance in conversation is implicit,
not explicit. Most conversation does not in so many words
define the nature of the world. Rather, it takes place
against the background of a world that is silently taken
for granted" (p. 140).
From the foregoing, one can see the two major contributions
of the Ethnomethodological movement,

firstly, the Ethnomethodo-

logists demonstrated that the social world is based on an infirm and
implicit moral structure, a situation that has several obvious im
plications for the individual.

For one thing, he or she may experi

ence contradictions in reality, that is, the moral order.

A child

raised on the values of honesty and achievement, for example, may
find that the best way to get ahead is through underhanded means.
Also, the individual may be faced with confusion and equivocality since
morality tends to be upheld implicitly through conversation, a process
which can be filled with ambiguity and uncertainty, and because morality
may change quite drastically over time and space.
This brings us to the second finding of the Ethnomethodologists,
which is that people tend to objectify and solidify the subjective
world.

That is, they adhere to and follow their beliefs and morals

"as if" they were real.

A society's members, said Garfinkel, "...refer

to this world as 'the natural fact of life' which, for members, are
through and through moral facts of life" (1967, p. 35).
tion however, was really nothing new.

This asser

One of the first attempts at

explaining this "as if" world was made by the German philosopher Hans
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Vaihinger in 1911:
"What we generally call 'truth', namely, a conceptual
world coinciding with the external world, is merely
the most expedient error...that is, that system of ideas
which enables us to act and deal with things most rapidly,
neatly, and safely, and with the minimum of irrational ele
ments.
...The whole framework in which we place what is
perceived is only subjective; subjective is fictional;
fictional is false; falsehood is error" (1925, p. 108).
The same position may also be found in Alfred Adler's psychologi
cal theory, which incorporated much of Vaihinger's philosophy:

"The

human mind shows an urge to capture into fixed forms, through unreal
assumptions, that is, fictions, that which is chaotic, always in
flux, and incomprehensible" (1964, p. 96).
In spite of the unreal nature of fictions, they perform a de
sirable and purposive function for the individual.

Fictions reduce

the complexities and contradictions of a mass of experience to practical
and manageable proportions.

They allow one to derive sense and meaning

from the environment, and provide the person with the capacity to act
with any degree of conviction, confidence, and direction.

"It is the

fiction which teaches us to differentiate, which gives us support and
security, which shapes and guides our doings and actions, and which
forces our mind to foresee and to perfect itself"(Adler, 1964, p. 97).
Although all values, beliefs, attitudes, and virtues have a
fictive base, some are more important to the individual than others
and are, as a result, reified to a greater extent.

For example, it

is one thing for a person to question his or her belief that "Pepsodent
cleans teeth their whitest", but quite another to question one's own
estimate of personal worth.

This set of especially meaningful and
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important fictions, to which Darely (1938) ascribed deep-seated preju
dices, systematic stereotypes, and self concept, goes by a variety of
names, e.g., internal frame of reference (Rogers), private world (Frank),
and apperceptive schema (Adler), but the meaning underlying these dif
ferent terms is consistent.

They all refer to an attitudinal core or

point of orientation which the person takes as fixed and stable, and
which acts as the foundation for self consistency.

This process of

building a consistent state of affairs around a basic core was explored
by Leon Festinger (1957), whose Cognitive Dissonance Theory assumes
that the person strives to reduce or avoid dissonance and enhance con
sonance.

Festinger noted that when two expressions of the individual

are in conflict, that which is the more important will resist change
while the one of lesser importance to the person will in some way be
modified or rejected so as to maintain the integrity of the more signi
ficant construct.

Although Festinger's interest was in investigating

how the individual deals with dissonance in belief and behavior, the
♦

theory can be expanded to include other expressions of the personality,
too.

Aronson, for example, concluded after a review of relevant litera

ture that the general principles of the Cognitive Dissonance Theory may
appropriately be applied to the perceptual processes.

To use his own

words, "Individuals will distort the objective world in order to reduce
dissonance" (1972, p. 98).
It should be apparent that the frame of reference is not just an
intricate collating device or computer that deals with information and
events as is, but that it also has a hand in determining what form that
information will take.

The notion that the internal processes take part
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in the formation of a given percept has existed in theory for quite
some time.

As Adler stated, "But a perception is never to be compared

with a photographic image because something of the peculiar and indi
vidual quality of the person is inextricably bound up with it" (1927,
p. 49).

And Frank, in presenting what is often considered the first

projective theory of any far-reaching significance, came to similar
conclusions:
"We may emphasize that personality is approachable as
a process or operation of an individual who organizes
experience and reacts affectively to situations. This
process is dynamic in the sense that the individual person
ality imposes upon the common public world of events (what
we call nature) his meanings and significances, his organi
zation and patterns, and he invests the situation thus
structured with an affective meaning to which he responds
idiomatically" (1927, p. 413).
In spite of its theorectical presence, this kind of thinking did
not work its way into the field of perceptual research with any real
impact until the late 1940's.

At that time, a group of psychologists

led by Jerome Bruner and his Directive State Theory set out to exper
imentally demonstrate the internal determinants of perception, that
perception is not simply a mirror of the objective world, but that
it is also molded by one's expectations and beliefs.

Three of their

studies are worth mentioning here.
In one of the first studies, Bruner & Goodman (1947) showed five
coins, namely, the penny, nickel, dime, quarter and half dollar, to a
group of children who were instructed to estimate the size of each coin
with a circle of light.

Another group of children underwent the same

procedure except that they were presented with five cardboard disks the
same size as the coins.

The results showed that while the latter group
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was quite accurate in their estimations, the former group magnified,
or "accentuated", the actual size of the coins to considerable and
statistically significant proportions.

In a second part of this ex

periment, rich and poor children made their estimates and it was found
that although both groups tended to accentuate actual coin size, the
poor children, who were apparently in greater need of money, did so
to a greater extent.

The authors concluded that value orientation and

subjective need play a part in the perceptual processes, and the extent
to which these internal factors are active depends upon the strength or
importance of the value or need in question.
Perceptual accentuation was again demonstrated by Bruner & Postman
(1948), who presented adult subjects with positive, negative, and neutral
symbols, i.e., a dollar sign, swastika, and diagonal pattern, respectively.
They found that subjects' estimates of the positive and negative symbols'
sizes were significantly maginified over actual sizes, and concluded that
such perceptual distortion is adaptively meaningful.

That is, accentua

tion of value-congruent events alerts the person to potential reward
and furthermore maximizes the reward value of the event, and "...accentu
ation of negative symbols may aid under certain conditions in preparing
the organism for defense and action" (p. 207).
In a third study, Postman, Bruner & McGinnies (1948) administered
the Allport-Vernon Study of Values to subjects, who were also tachistoscopically presented with 36 words judged by an independent panel to
represent the six value categories of the test.

It was found that

test scores and recognition times produced an inverse correlation.

That

is, subjects tended to recognize most rapidly those words that represented
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important and desirable values, and slowest those that represented
unimportant or undesirable values.

A Chi-square test on this rela

tionship was significant at the 1% level.

The authors concluded that

these results were indicative of two perceptual processes that operate
in the service of one's attitudinal frame of reference, namely, defense
and sensitization.

The former term refers to ignoring or delaying

recognition of events which are noxious, annoying, dissonant, or
otherwise bothersome.

Sensitization, on the other hand, refers to the

swift acknowledgement of events that coincide with one's values or
are adaptively significant.
One complaint that may be lodged against the above studies is
that they were artificial, that is, they examined perception in situa
tions that are quite far removed from what one might encounter in day
to day living.

Hastrof & Cantril (1954), however, avoided this problem

by exposing their subjects to a complex interpersonal matrix.

These

authors showed the film of a football game between Dartmouth and Princeton
to students of the two colleges, who were instructed to view the film as
objectively as possible, and note each rule infraction and the responsible
player.

The results showed that

Princeton students recorded a preponder

ance of wrongdoing on the part of the Dartmouth players, and vice versa.
The authors concluded that this distortion occurred as a consequence of
the students' attempts to give meaning and significance to the complexities
and ambiguities of the event:
"We do not simply 'react to' a happening or to some im
pingement from the environment in a determined way...We
behave according to what we bring to the occasion, and
what each of us brings to the occasion is more or less
unique. And except for the significances which we bring to
the occasion, the happenings around us would be meaningless,
would be 'inconsequential'" (p. 133).
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Cantril reinforced this stand in a later article where he said,
"We seem to give meaning and order to sensory impingements in terms
of our own needs and purposes and this process of selection is act
ively creative" (1957, p. 123).
Although the Directive State Theory came under heavy criticism
for its alleged overemphasis on the role of internal factors in the
formation of perception —

Bruner himself realized this shortcoming

and later revised his thinking into the more acceptable Hypothesis
Theory^ —

it did make psychologists and especially experimentalists

aware of, and stimulate interest in, the possible ramifications of
values, needs, and attitudes on perception.

The area in which the

Directive State and Hypothesis Theories had their greatest impact was
that of projective psychology.

Bruner was aware of the similarity

between his ideas on perception and existing thought in the field of
projection and projective personality assessment, and attempted to
integrate the two in his article "Perceptual Theory and the Rorschach

"''The Hypothesis Theory, which, like the Directive State Theory,
attempted to explain perceptual distortion, removed the role of in
ternal factors one step from the actual perceptual processes. In
this theory, it was assumed that on the basis of past experience,
attitudes, and needs the individual posits a number of hypotheses
about the world. The person compares what actually happens to what
is hypothesized or expected and if the objective situation does not
fit the hypothesis, the latter is modified or rejected. If, on the
other hand, a hypothesis is given rather constant reinforcement, it
becomes more difficult to reject or change because the person tends
to become selectively vigilant to an equal degree. That is, he or she
becomes tuned into the recognition of supporting evidence in the en
vironment and more or less turned off to opposing evidence. The main
difference between this and the Directive State Theory is that while
the latter comes dangerously close to a wish fulfillment model of
perception, the former is more akin to that of a feedback loop.
(See
Bruner, 1957)
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Test" (1948).

His basic assumption, based on previous research, was

that perception is the result of a cooperation between internal pro
cesses and external circumstances, and that the extent to which inter
nal factors participate is dependent upon the ambiguity of the stimuli
and the strength of the need or value involved:
"Generally speaking, the less structuredness or univocality
of the stimulus input, the more striking the role of direc
tive, nonsensory factors will be in determining perceptual
organization...And generally speaking again, the greater the
strength of the directive factors in the perceiver, say the
greater the strength of his needs, the more the likelihood of
their entering into the determination of a perceptual organi
zation when the perceiver is in a situation related to his
needs" (p. 161).
The foregoing analysis presents what may be considered the two
basic assumptions of projective psychology.

First, to use the words of

Robert White, "Every performance of a person is an expression of his
whole personality" (quoted by Bruner, 1948, pp. 157-158).

That is,

the various expressions of the individual, perception included, tend
to hang together in a consistent manner as described by the Cognitive
Dissonance Theory.

The person will perceptually distort the environ

ment in order to give it meaning with respect to a larger frame of
reference:
"The individual organizes experience as he warps, twists,
distorts, and otherwise fits every situation, event, and
person into the framework of his private world, giving
them the affective significance which they must have for
him in his private world" (Frank, 1948, p. 15).
And, secondly, as stated above by Bruner, the extent to which one's
"private world" is projected upon the public or objective world de
pends upon the equivocality of the event and/or the strength of the
internal factor in question.
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Although perception has been the sine qua non of projective
psychology, the first afore mentioned assumption, namely, that all
expressions of the person take part in the process of adaptation,
suggests that other avenues of approach are available.

Any human

expression that relies upon the person's internal state, because
of either the intrinsic nature of that process or the situation in
which it must operate, can be used projectively.

The present paper

is especially concerned with the projective nature of memory, that
the recollection of past events is influenced and molded by the attitudinal frame of reference of the individual.
First of all, it should be noted that the comments and conclusions
made previously with respect to perception may be applied to memory,
as well, for it is merely an intellectual convenience to think of the
two as separate agencies of the personality.

The French philosopher

Henri Bergson was adamant on this inseparability of perception and
memory:
"Our perceptions are undoubtedly interlaced with memories,
and inversely, a memory...only becomes actual by borrowing
the body of some perception into which it slips. These two
acts, perception and recollection, always interpenetrate each
other, are always interchanging something of their substance
as by a process of endomosis" (1911, p. 72).
Although an experimenter may attempt to cancel out the effects of
memory in order to arrive at a clean measure of perception, the end
result is destined to fall short of total success.

Bruner & Postman

(1948) realized the functional similarity of these two processes and
rather casually expanded the results of their study on perception to
pertain to memory as well:

"One cannot expect a simple one-to-one
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relationship between the affective symbolic value of objects and
perceptual or mnemonic accentuation" (p. 207).

The Directive State

and Hypothesis Theories of perception made no effort to exclude
memory as a determinant.

Memory, either in the form of attitudes

and needs, or hypotheses, has a definite place in the determination
of perception.
Just as it is in error to think of perception as a slave to en
vironmental events, so is it to consider memory as an uninvolved store
house of past perceptions.

Memory, like perception, serves an adaptive

and utilitarian function for the individual. One may again consider
the philosophy of Bergson:
"The function of the body is not to store up recollections,
but simply to choose, in order to bring back to distinct con
sciousness, by the real efficacy thus conferred on it, the
useful memory, that which may complete and illuminate the
present situation with a view to ultimate action" (1911,
pp. 233-234).
And, "Its primary function is to evoke all those past perceptions which
are analogous to the present perception, to recall to us what pre
ceded and followed them, and so to suggest to us that decision which
is the most useful" (p. 303).
Bartlett (1932), on the basis of a number of studies, went one
step beyond Bergson and proposed that memory is not only subject to
selective recall, but that the actual content of what is recalled is
a personal construction fashioned to fit the needs of the individual
in a given situation as well.

To use his own words, "Remembering ap

pears to be far more decisively an affair of construction rather than
one of mere reproduction" (p. 205), and "The past is being continually
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re-made, reconstructed in the interests of the present" (p. 309).
Bartlett went on to suggest that memory is constructed in this manner
so as to reinforce or justify current attitudes:

"When a subject is

being asked to remember, very often the first thing that emerges is
something of the nature of attitude.

The recall is then a construc

tion, made largely on the basis of attitude, and its general effect is
that of a justification of the attitude" (p. 207).
Adler, who borrowed from Bergson's philosophy, but worked indepen
dently of Bartlett, also took notice of the selectivity involved in
memory, and of the contiguity of memory and attitude:
"We remember those events whose recollections further an im
portant underlying movement. We forget likewise all those
events which detract from the fulfillment of a plan. We
find thus that memory, too, is subordinated to the business
of purposive adaptation...(Lasting) memories are frequently
surcharged with a one-sided prejudice, may...appear as an
attitude, an emotional tone, or even as a philosophic point
of view" (1927, p. 50).
And Dreikurs, in a presentation of Adlerian psychology, had the
following to say about memory, which is reminiscent of Bartlett's posi
tion:

"All memory serves to justify a definite line of conduct which

is being pursued at the time or has been planned for the future...There
can be no doubt that each individual tries to justify his attitude
by looking back to those experiences" (1950, p. 86).
Experimental evidence for the influence of attitudes on memory
retention and recall is also available.

Watson & Hartmann (1939),

for example, found that theistic and atheistic subjects remembered
in greater quantity and with better quality material which supported
their religious attitude, and that they often distorted adversary positions
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so as to make them less effective or to give them a different meaning
more compatible with one's beliefs.

Although the overall results

of this study were descriptively consistent with memory theory, the
majority of statistical analyses fell short of significance.

Similarly,

Edwards (1941) found that subjects who favored or opposed New Deal
politics better retained information supporting their stand.

The re

sults of this study, however, were statistically significant, which
Edwards took as support for his hypothesis that,"Experiences which
harmonize with an existing frame of reference will tend to be learned
and remembered better than experiences which conflict with the same
frame of reference" (p. 36).

It should be noted, however, that subjects

did not simply forget or somehow distort all oppositional material, for
this would lead the individual far from the world to which he or she
must adapt.

In fact, as found by Watson & Hartmann, subjects tended

to remember with good quality such material when it was of a strong or
formidable character.

That is, the person must not only be reminded of

what one is working with, but also what he or she is up against.

Memories,

out of adaptive necessity, not only "speak clearly the language of en
couragement", but also "of warning" (Adler, 1927, p. 50).
The foregoing indicates that memories are a creative and adaptively
purposeful production of the individual.

They tend to align themselves

and be consonant with attitudes, which they further serve to justify.
Thus, like perception, memory is subject to distortion and selectivity
according to one's values, attitudes, and needs in a given situation.
In fact, as suggested by Freud (1965, p. 655), memories may provide a
more fertile soil for projection than perception since the former is
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further removed from the objective world, and thus give the inner
processes a broader range of influence.

That is, perception always

takes place within an objective situation, which sets definite limits
to the amount of distortion, and therefore projection, that can take
place.

Memory, on the other hand, is largely an artifact of some

past happening and lacks the restraints of immediate reality.

As

a result, memory, as compared to perception, "involves a greater degree
of imagination and internal determination, and thus has a greater
projective potential.
A considerable amount of interest was generated in childhood
memories, in particular, at the turn of the last century, and the
result was a number of investigations that took a strictly taxonomic
and statistical approach (Miles, 1893; Henri & Henri, 1898; Colegrove,
1899; Hall, 1899).

These authors were concerned primarily with deter

mining such things as the average age of first memories, sense modalities
employed, differences between the memories of men and women, the emotional
tone of memories, and their accuracy.

None of these studies, however,

attempted to explain why or for what reason one particular event might
be rememebered and not another, or otherwise give the results any
meaning within a theoretical frame.

Such attempts to deal with early

recollections within a larger theoretical perspective of personality
did not appear on the scene until the interests of Freud and Adler were
pointed in that direction.

Although the ideas of these two men on

memory were blatantly antithetical, they managed to agree on two points,
namely, that early memories are significant in the study of personal
ity, and that they are, for the most part, erroneous reconstructions of
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what actually happened.

(Concerning this second point, see Freud,

1953, p. 376; and Adler, 1937, p. 283.)

In reference to what differs

between their theories, in a very brief sense, Freud stressed
amnesia and selective repression in first memories, that is, what
they hid.

Adler, on the other hand, was interested in selective

retention and therefore with what recollection revealed about the
person.
In Freud's opinion, childhood memories are "screen memories",
which "...owe their preservation not to their own content but to an
associative relation between their content and another which is re
pressed" (1960, p. 43).

He went on to say, "The formation of screen

memories has at its basis the forgetting of other more important mem
ories" (p. 45).

For Freud, then, early recollections serve to screen

or hide repressed material, the awareness of which would be too pain
ful and overwhelming for the person to handle, but at the same time
to provide symbolic expression.

The impulse or conflict exists, but

it is replaced in awareness by a benign analogy or metaphor:
"The child no less than the adult only retains what is
important; but what is important is represented (by the
processes of condensation, and more importantly, of
displacement...) in the memory by something apparently
trivial" (1953, p. 211).
A good example of this theory, which assumes that the manifest
memory content is an innocuous and symbolic expression of some latent
and repressed material, put into practice was given by Freud as follows
"A. man of twenty-four has preserved the following picture
from his fifth year. He is sitting in the garden of a
summer villa, on a small chair beside his aunt, who is
trying to teach him the letters of the alphabet. He is
in difficulties over the difference between 'm' and 'n'
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and he asks his aunt to tell him how to know one from
the other. His aunt points out to him that the 'm'
has a whole piece more than the 'n' — the third stroke.
There appeared to be no reason for challenging the
trustworthiness of this childhood memory; it had, however,
only acquired its meaning at a later date, when it showed
itself suited to represent symbolically another of the boy's
curiosities. For just as at that time he wanted to know the
difference between 'm' and 'n', so later he was anxious to
find out the difference between boys and girls, and would
have been willing for this particular aunt to be the one
to teach him. He also discovered then that the difference
was a similar one — that a boy, too, has a whole piece
more than a girl; and at the time when he acquired this
piece of knowledge he called up the recollection of the
parallel curiosity of his childhood" (1960, pp. 48-49).
From this example and other comments by Freud one can see that his
theory of childhood memories holds true to his general atomistic
approach to personality.

That is, an early recollection is the re

sult of an ego compromise.

The id is given partial gratification,

but in such symbolic form

that retaliation

anxiety and guilt feelings, is

from thesuperego, i.e.,

obviated.

Unlike Freud, who, as we have seen, concentrated his efforts
on exposing the hypothesized latent content, Adler claimed that there
is no such thing as latent content in memory.

Instead, the important

information is to be found in the beliefs and feelings manifestly
revealed in early recollections, which supposedly coincide with one's
basic frame of reference.

This approach is

based onAdler's theory of

life style, which assumes

that all expressions of the individual have

the same basic meaning and spring from the same basic source.

The

person retains in awareness those childhood events which best exemplify
and reinforce a given set of attitudes to be employed in his or her
unique mode of goal striving toward a goal of superiority and away
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from a feeling of inferiority:
"The basic attitudes which have guided the individual
throughout his life and which prevail, likewise, in his
present situation, are reflected in those fragments which
he has selected to epitomize his feelings about life, and
to cherish in his memory as reminders. He has preserved
these as his early recollections" (Adler, 1937, p. 287).
Throughout his career, Adler stressed the concepts of holism
and unity of the personality, which propose that the various parts of
the personality are consistent with each other and are merely varia
tions of the same theme.

Although the basic frame of reference, there

fore, may be inferred from any expression of the individual, Adlerians
are particularly interested in, and rely heavily upon, information
obtained from early recollections.
emphasis.

There are two reasons for this

Firstly, people tend to look upon their first memories as

meaningless curiosities and, as a result, present them to the therapist
with little fear of revealing some unsavory bit of information.

But

it is just this notion that there is nothing worth hiding in early
recollections that makes them so revealing.

As stated by Adler, "In

the main, people are perfectly willing to discuss their first memories.
They take them as mere facts and do not realize the meaning hidden
in them" (1931, p. 75).

Because the person thinks of these memories

as irrelevant or silly, they tend to be exempt from the disguises and
safeguarding mechanisms that commonly imbue the day to day expressions
of the individual.

Early recollections, therefore, present a clear and

uncontaminated picture of one's basic view of life or frame of reference.
The second reason for the special significance of early recollections is
due to their distance from the objective world.

That is, one may be
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able to recall with perfect clarity all the details of an event
that happened a week ago, and perhaps the main details of one of
a year ago.

But when a period of twenty, thirty, forty, or more years

separates the actual event from its recollection, the memory content
tends to deteriorate and the details become foggy.

As a result of

this ambiguity, the person must project something in the memory so
that it makes sense, and has meaning within his or her conceptualiza
tion of the world, in much the same way that one responds to a Rorschach
card.
One can see from these two reasons that the interest of Adlerians
in early recollections is more of a practical than theoretical one.
Although they do have a sound base in the theory, it is unusual to
find any mention of early recollections in Adlerian literature outside
of case studies and discussions of the practical applications of the
theory.

But within this practical setting, first memories are essential.

As stated by Adler himself, "I would never investigate a personality
without asking for the first memory" (1931, p. 75).
It should be obvious that Adler conceptualized memory, and
especially early memories, as the result of attitudes and thus re
flective of attitudes, a position which is nearly identical with that
of Bartlett.

Because of this supposed attitudinal base of memory, the

Adlerian interpretation of early recollections likewise has an atti
tudinal bias.

With this respect, Mosak (1958) had the following to

say about the Adlerian interpretive scheme:
"In interpreting early recollections it should be under
stood that what is elicited are the individual's attitudes
and not a mere description of his overt behavior...The re
collections describe a modus vivendi rather than a modus
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operandi" (p. 305).
Mosak went on to give the following example of the Adlerian method,
which, in contrast to Freud's, shows an emphasis on what the memory
reveals rather than hides:
"ER — We had a cookie jar on the top shelf in the
kitchen. I couldn't reach it by myself, so my uncle
lifted me up, and I got the cookie jar.
"Interpretation — This memory, given by a woman, is
suggestive of a feeling of smallness on her part. In
order to get the 'goodies' of life, she must rely upon the
assistance of bigger people. From a diagnostic viewpoint
dependency upon her uncle may be significant. However,
the recollection expresses a more generalized dependency
feeling either toward all people or with respect to men
specifically...Nonetheless, even were the above incident
an isolated occurrence in the subject's life history or
perhaps even fictitious with no actual dependency on the uncle
possible, the retention of the incident would point to an
underlying, generalized feeling of dependency" (pp. 304-305).
During the past two decades, a number of investigations have been
performed in order to determine the efficiency and validity of early
recollections as a personality measure.

The overall results indicate

that manifest content interpretation of first memories provides accurate
and meaningful personality information.
One of the first experiments on the projective use of first
memories was performed by Lieberman (1957), who administered a pro
jective test battery, composed of the Rorschach, Wechsler-Bellevue,
and House-Tree-Person drawings, to 25 subjects, in addition to obtain
ing their early recollections.

Two personality assessments via a

trait check list were made for each subject, one on the basis of the
tests, and the other on early recollections.

The results showed that

interpretations based on first memories were substantiated by the
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the projective tests to a statistically significant degree (p<.001),
although the testing approach tended to provide a greater quantity
of information.

Lieberman concluded, "The advantages of utilizing

childhood memories were the ease and rapidity of obtaining them as
well as their function as a check upon other projective materials"
(p. 36).
Levy & Grigg (1962) elicited early recollections from 21
psychiatric patients and used this information to score subjects
on the continuums of Dependency-Independency, Destructive AggressionConstructive Aggression, and Sexuality, each of which consisted of
several thematic categories.

The authors then attempted to match

their profiles based on early memories with reports written by the
subjects' therapists.
chance of Type I error.

Their matchings were successful beyond a .03%
The authors concluded that early recollections

may be used as measures of "preconscious themes", but added that the
validity of this technique tends to deteriorate when the subject is
characterized by massive and pervasive denial and when first memories
are vague and barren.
In Friedberg's study (1975), it was hypothesized that early re
collections would provide sufficient information to differentiate
homosexuals from heterosexuals on seven variables.

It was expected that

the former gorup would present recollections indicative of greater
dependency needs, a view of the world as a more dangerous and hostile
place, and lesser social interest, gender identity, self identity,
activity and initiative, and goal direction.

The sample consisted of

30 homosexuals and 30 heterosexuals, who were instructed to write their

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

22
early recollections down on paper.

The raters had no face to face

contact with the subjects and scored each protocol without knowing
from which group it came.

The mean scores for the two groups on

the seven variables were then compared and the differences found to
be significant at or beyond the 5% level for the first five variables
mentioned above.

On the basis of these results, Friedberg concluded

that, "ERs can be used to aid in identifying life styles" (p. 204).
Ferguson (1964) attempted to determine how efficiently clinicians
could match early recollection protocols with life style reports
in two separate studies.

In the first, three leading members of the

American Society of Adlerian Psychology were used as judges.

Each inter

viewed 30 subjects and for each wrote a summary life style report, re
sulting in three reports for each subject, or 90 in all.

Each judge

then attempted to match the 60 reports written by the other two with
protocols.

All three clinicians were successful beyond the .003 level

of significance.

In the second part of this study, matchings were made

using the reports and protocols of ten subjects from the above pro
cedure, by ten clinicians of various theoretical positions who further
more had no face to face contact with the subjects.

The ten judges in

cluded six Freudians, two Adlerians, and two eclectics who were familiar
with the Adlerian interpretation of first memories.

They were all in

structed to make their matchings on the basis of their own judgement.
Seven of the judges were able to make successful matchings ranging from
a .03 level to perfect matching.

The three judges whose results did

not reach significance were all senior psychoanalysts, who admitted
they could make no sense out of the procedure and made no successful
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matchings at all.
It should be noted that the above studies were successful in
differentiating persons or groups according to information obtained
from early recollections on dimensions ranging from the discrete cate
gories used by Levy & Grigg to the gestalt type life style reports in
Ferguson's study.

Thus, it would appear that early recollections

provide valid personality information regardless of whether one is
interested in determining, say, how aggressive a person is, or his
or her more general view of life.

It should also be noted that the

above studies, which are representative of others concerned with the
validity of first memories, did not involve making a prediction for
each subject with respect to a given performance.

Although Levy &

Grigg came close to a predictive investigation, their results were
complicated by the matching task.

In fact, in an extensive review

of the literature on this topic, the present author was able to find
only one bone fide predictive study (McCarter, Tomkins & Schiffman, 1961).
The authors of that experiment obtained early recollections from 75
university students and used that information to predict scores on
several scales of the Tomkins-Horn Picture Arrangement Test.

The re

sults, however, were mixed, with predictions exceeding chance levels
of success on some scales, but failing on others.

Thus, the present

investigation, which is of the predictive type, is justified because
of the paucity of this kind of research.

In addition, the present

study is of immediate value in a practical sense, since whenever a
therapist makes a guess or a hunch about a client on the basis of
first memories, he or she is making a prediction.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

24

As stated earlier, first memories do not simply satisfy the
curiosities of the therpist, but also serve a definite purpose for
the individual.

They remind the person of his or her goals, inter

ests, and beliefs, and encourage and justify action consistent with
one's basic frame of reference.

But this link between belief and

action is not a simple and direct one.

For these beliefs to be trans

lated into action, as Dreikurs (1967) has made clear, a concomitant
and appropriate emotional response must occur as well.

Emotions,

to use Dreikurs' words:
"...provide the fuel, the steam, so to speak, for our
actions, the driving force without which we would be
impotent. They come into play whenever we decide to
do something forcefully. They make it possible for us
to carry out our decisions. They permit us to take a
stand, to develop definite attitudes, to form convictions"
(p. 207).
Dreikurs went on to say, "Strong emotions indicate strong desires.

And

without strong desires nobody is going to do much about anything" (p.
213).
Since it would appear that the influence of a belief upon action
depends upon the strength of the accompanying feeling state, it is
hypothesized here that early recollections that are subject to fre
quent recall will provide lower predictive validity than those of
infrequent recall.

That is, since the emotion eliciting properties

of a stimulus tend to deteriorate as a function of frequent exposure
to that stimulus, as shown in the therapeutical intervention of flood
ing, for example, it would seem that if one thinks often of his or
her early recollections, then the emotional response to them weakens
in intensity.

And as this feeling state weakens, it is assumed that
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so does the influence of attitudes, as conveyed in memory, on other
expressions of the individual.

A second reason for this hypothesized

outcome is that if one is frequently exposed to an event, that event
may lose the freshness and ambiguity necessary as inducements to pro
jection.

For example, if a person were permitted to mull over a

Rorschach card on several occasions before actually giving a response
to it, that response would probably be of little value.

By that time

the individual would have been able to go beyond his or her immediate
and important needs and attitudes to find a percept that best fits
the stimulus, in an objective sense.

With early recollections, as

well, frequent recall would probably enhance the probability that
detailed elaborations are based on logic, or what probably happened in
reality, and thus reduce the projective effect.

In addition, a high

rate of recall may lead the person to think of the recollection as a
significant and important event in and of iteself, which may result
in the memory content becoming clouded by a variety of defense and
safeguarding mechanisms. Although this issue is of apparent clinical
importance, there have been no investigations, to the author's knowledge,
of either theoretical or empirical nature on the effect of recall fre
quency on the validity of early recollections.
The third hypothesis of the present study is that there is no
difference between the predictive validities of early and later child
hood memories.

Even though Adler's theory emphasized the unity of the

personality, that is, all expressions of the person have the same basic
purpose and meaning, clinicians are especially interested in early
childhood recollections.

Mosak (1958), for example, claimed that memories
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from late childhood are more easily influenced by one's "current
mood" than early childhood memories, and are thus less accurate
indicators of the basic frame of reference.

He arbitrarily sets

the cut off point for early childhood memories at eight years of
age.

2

However, Mosak's assertion seems curious since all human

expressions, including current mood and later childhood memories,
are theoretically subject to and consistent with this frame of re
ference.

Adler himself warned, "We should not distinguish too

sharply between old and new remembrances, for in new remembrances also
the action line is involved" (1929, p. 118).
In summary, the present study is an attempt to support the
following hypotheses.
1. The manifest content of early recollections may be used to
successfully predict personality variables.
2. Predictions that are based on recollections subject to fre
quent recall are of lesser predictive value than those of
infrequent recall.
3.

No difference exists between the validities of predictions
based on early childhood memories and late childhood memories.

2

Whenever a distinction is to be made between recollections
according to the age variable, the terms "early childhood memories"
and "late childhood memories" will be used. All other terms, e.g.,
early recollections and first memories, will pertain to both age
categories.
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METHOD

Subjects

Subjects (Ss) for the present study were drawn from two psychia
tric residential treatment centers and one outpatient agency in Kalamazoo
and Van Buren Counties.

They numbered 42, 18 men and 24 women, and re

presented all general diagnostic categories, i.e., neurosis, psychosis,
personality disorder, transient situational disturbance, and alcohol and
substance abuse.

Ages ranged from 17 to 59 years, with a modal range

of 20 to 30 years.
Criteria for inclusion into the sample were that Ss be literate,
willing to take part in the study, and not in a psychotic episode
or immediate crisis situation.

Nearly all clients of the two residen

tial programs during a twelve week period were contacted and approxi
mately 70% met criteria.
sample.

These Ss constitute about 70% of the total

Attempts were also made over a three week period to contact

as many of the outpatient clients as possible.

Most were contacted

before or after group or individual therapy sessions and only about
20% met criteria, due mainly to their lack of interest in the study.
Thus, in terms of composition, the present sample is best representative
of a residential population.

However, in determining to whom the re

sults may properly be applied, the outpatient elements should not be
disregarded.

This is said not only because of the actual presence

of outpatients in the sample, but also because of the vague and fluid
line that differentiates the two groups.

That is, most residential

27
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Ss in this sample were at one time outpatients and will probably re
sume that status at the end of their residential stay.

Likewise,

many of the outpatient Ss underwent residential treatment at one time
or another.

In fact, this kind of mobility between outpatient and

residential sectors can be expanded to include psychiatric inpatients
as well, since the majority of Ss had,

on one or more occasions, parti

cipated in this kind of treatment, especially at Kalamazoo State
Hospital and the Borgess Hospital Psychiatric Unit.

Thus, even though

the present sample, on the face of it, is largely representative of a
residential population, the high degree of client mobility between
outpatient, residential, and inpatient agencies indicates that the
results of this study may be generalized to an overall psychiatric
population.

Procedure

If a client met criteria, he or she was administered the Edwards
Personal Preference Schedule (EPPS) and asked to give his or her early
memories.

Administration of the test always preceded elicitation of

recollections since it was anticipated that some Ss might decide to
drop out of the study during the testing procedure.

This actually

happened on two or three occasions, however.
The EPPS was chosen for this study for two reasons.

First, it

is a rather short test, composed of 225 items, and thus presented
minimal risk of a high drop out rate due to apprehension of committing
a considerable amount of one's time and energy to an unexciting task.
Second, since the test scales relate to specific categories of behavior,
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it was thought that predicted scores could be made without compli
cation from a number of concomitant variables, as would have been
the case with Cattell's 16PF, for example.
Percentile scores on three EPPS scales, namely, Deference,
Affiliation, and Succorance, were used as dependent or criterion var
iables.

As one can see in Table I, which presents examples of test

statements related to these scales, the scale titles are quite descrip
tive of what they measure.

That is, Deference measures the extent

to which one conforms to authority and convention, Affiliation, one's
need for friendship, and Succorance, one's need for sympathy, help,
and pity.

Although any or all of the total fifteen EPPS scales could

have been used for this study, it was decided to use a small number
of them since the size of the critical Bonferroni F statistic would in
crease proportionally with the number of scales.

For example, while

the critical value for 32 Ss and three scales is 6.43 at the 5% level,
that for all fifteen scales would be 10.17.

The above three scales,

in particular, were chosen because in the author's experience, early
recollections from a psychiatric population commonly include events
related to authority, friendship, and succorance, and would thus seem
to have the best promise of providing the information necessary to
make predicted scores for a large proportion of Ss on each scale.
After the S finished the test, he or she was given the following
instructions as a means to obtaining early recollections:
back as far as you can.

What is your earliest memory?

your mind as if it were happening again."

"Remember

Picture it in

Ss were further encouraged

to give as much detail as possible, through open ended questions like
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Table I:

Examples of test statements for EPPS scales Deference, Affili
ation, and Succorance.
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TABLE I

EXAMPLES OF TEST STATEMENTS FOR EPPS SCALES
DEFERENCE, AFFILIATION, AND SUCCORANCE

Deference

I like to follow instructions and do what is
expected of me; I like to conform to custom
and avoid doing things that people I respect
might consider unconventional; I like to ac
cept the leadership of people I admire; When
I am in a group, I like to accept the leader
ship of someone else in deciding what the group
is going to do.

Affiliation

I like to have strong attachments with my
friends; I like to make as many friends as
I can; I like to form new friendships; I
like to be loyal to my friends.

Succorance

I like my friends to feel sorry for me when
I am sick; I like my friends to sympathize
with me and to cheer me up when I am depressed;
I like my friends to make a fuss over me when
I am hurt or sick; I like my friends to encourage
me when I meet with failure.
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"And then what happened?" and "Can you recall any more details?", plus
a verbal statement regarding the feeling tone of the memory.

Ss were

also asked how old they were at the time of and how often they think
of the recalled event.

This procedure was repeated until the S could

recall no more early memories or until five had been accumulated.
On the average, each S presented 2.8 memories, with a mode of 3.0.
All of this information was obtained in a single face to face session
with each S, taken down in longhand as accurately as possible, and
shortly thereafter typed onto a prepared form.

Although taping these

sessions would have undoubtedly been more accurate, it was opted to
use the above procedure in order to avoid any problems with confiden
tiality and the possibility of Ss becoming distracted or balking
at the idea of being taped.
Independent or predictor variables were the predicted EPPS test
scores for the three scales based on information found in early re
collections.

(For a description of the scoring method, see the Appendix.)

These predicted scores were dichotomous, that is, high or low, which
were transformed into numerical form, 1 or 0, respectively, for the
data analyses.

Although ideally each S would have been given three

predicted scores, one for each scale, this was not possible in many
cases simply because recollection protocols often lacked sufficient
information.

On the average, 2.4 predictions out of a possible three

were made for each S.

About 17% of the Ss received one predicted

score, 33% two predictions, and 50% three predictions.
In order to test the hypothesis that early recollections can
be used to successfully predict personality variables, the actual and
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predicted scores were correlated separately for the three scales,
and the resultant F values compared to Bonferroni F statistics for
significance.

Since the number of predicted scores varied across

the three scales, the Bonferroni values were likewise allowed to
vary as a function of the total number of predictions made for each
scale.
Since the three sets of criterion and predictor variables were
simultaneously tested for significance, it was necessary to use a
family-wise error rate in order to stabilize the probability of Type
I error.

That is, if the three obtained F values were compared to

typical univariate F statistics, the actual chance of Type I error

c

could range anywhere from OCto 1 - (1 -oc) , where c equals the number
of simultaneous tests.

For the present study, with three tests and a

significance level of 5%, a univariate approach would result in an
O

actual alpha of as much as 1 - (1 - .05) , or about 14%.

The Bonferroni

method avoids this potential inflation and stabilizes alpha by inter
preting the results in the same way they were obtained, that is, simul
taneously.

Whereas the univariate approach would make a separate in

ferential statement for each of the three tests, the Bonferroni would
make only one, which is, namely, at the 5% level, there is a 5% chance
that one or more of the statistically significant results are falsely
significant.
In order to test Hypotheses H a n d III, each predicted score was
classified according to the recollection age and recall frequency
of the memory or memories used in making that prediction.

For Hypo

thesis II, predictions were classified as coming from recollections
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of frequent or infrequent recall rates, which correspond to more
than once per three weeks and once per three weeks or less, respec
tively.

Actual and predicted scores were then correlated for the

three scales at these two levels of recall frequency.

The two cor

relation coefficients for each scale then underwent Fisher's z
transformation and were tested for a significant difference by com
puting a

%!(f

distribution.

value, which corresponds to a z score on the normal
Since these values of the three separate scales were

simultaneously tested, the actual probabilities of Type I error were
c
adjusted by the formula °^family = 1 - (1 - °<individual) •
A similar procedure was employed for Hypothesis III.

Predic

tions were classified as being based on recollections in which the
S was less than eight years of age or between eight and twelve years.
Recollections in which the person was older than twelve years were
not accepted for the study.

Eight predicted scores out of the total

99, however, were based on memories that included both age categories,
and were thrown out of the sample for this analysis.

Correlation

coefficients and Fisher's z transformations were computed for each
scale and the probabilities of Type I error determined as for Hypothesis
II.

Since Adlerians are concerned with early childhood memories, spe

cifically, it was decided that if the difference between the two age
levels for any scale exceeded a 10% level of confidence, then pre
dictions based on later childhood memories would be thrown out of
the sample for Hypotheses I and II.

If, on the other hand, the

differences are nonsignificant, this would be taken as support for
the hypothesis that predictive validity does not vary as a function
of recollection age, and both early and late childhood memories would
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be used to test Hypotheses I and II.
Since the author had face to face contact with all Ss prior
to making his predictions, a separate and independent set of pre3

dictions was made by a co-rater

in order to ensure that the scoring

method was practical and communicable, and that the author did, in
fact, base his predictions on the scoring scheme and not on intuition
or extraneous information and cues gained during the interviews.
The co-rater was instructed in the scoring method and given several
confabulated examples for practice before she actually made her
predictions.

3

The co-rater was a 35 year old female, who has her Masters
degree in education. She has little understanding of Adlerian
psychology, and even less of the clinical application of early
memories according to any theory, which enhanced the probability
that she relied exclusively on the scoring method in making her
predictions.
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RESULTS

Table II summarizes the results of the present study with re
spect to Hypothesis I, namely, that early recollections may be used
to successfully predict personality traits.

Starting from the left

side of the table, these columns indicate the scales, number of Ss
given a prediction, point biserial correlation coefficients, coeffi
cients of determination, mean percentile scores on the test scales
at the High level of prediction, percentile scores at the Low level
of prediction, the obtained F statistics, significance levels, biserial
correlation coefficients, biserial coefficients corrected for attenu
ation on the criterion variable, and inter-rater reliability coeffi
cients.

The bottom row of Table II gives several weighted averages,

for descriptive purposes only, on the combined values of the three
scales.
As seen in Table II, the correlation coefficients between actual
and predicted scores ranged from .364 to .587, with corresponding
F statistics from 5.51 to 13.18 for the three scales.

The F statis

tic for the Affiliation scale was found to exceed the Bonferroni
critical value at the 1% level of significance.

Statistical trends,

with probabilities of Type I error less than 10% but greater than
5%, were also found for the Deference and Succorance scales.
Inter-rater reliability coefficients were satisfactory and
ranged from .668 to .948.

In addition, for a prediction to be made,

the raters had to first decide whether sufficient information was
present in a given protocol, that is, whether or not it met the

36
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Table II:

A s u m m a r y of the validity coefficients between actual and
predicted scores and reliability coefficients for pre
dicted scores.
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TABLE II

A SUMMARY OF THE VALIDITY COEFFICIENTS BETWEEN ACTUAL AND PREDICTED SCORES
AND RELIABILITY COEFFICIENTS FOR PREDICTED SCORES

Scale

N

rpt. bis.

Deference

38

.364

Affiliation

27

Succorance

34

Weighted
Averages

r2

•^obt

sign • rbis.
level

rbis.xy'

r
XX

yh

yl

.132

52.00

31.05

5.51

.10

.444

.573

.948

.587

.345

65.45

31.88

13.18

.01

.683

.816

.832

.402

.162

71.17

38.00

6.17

.10

.487

.559

.668

.438

.200

62.25

33.66

.524

.634

.820

w
00
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scoring criteria as described in the Appendix.

Inter-rater agree

ment that such information did or did not exist was 92.9%, 88.1%,
and 78.6% for Deference, Affiliation, and Succorance, respectively.
These reliability coefficients and the percentages of agreement in
dicate that the scoring method was practical and communicable, and
that the author's face to face contact with Ss had little biasing
effect upon his predictions.

It may also be pointed out that if

the author did use extraneous information gained during the interviews,
then one would expect him to make more predictions than the co-rater
for the simple reason that he would have more to go on.

However, the

total number of predictions made by the two raters was almost the
same,

with the author predicting 99 scores and the co-rater 95.

Statistics under the heading "r
", i.e., biserial correlations,
bis.
are the point biserial correlation coefficients corrected for course
grouping.

These values refer to the correlations one would expect

if the study had used continuous data on the predictor variables.
The column headed "r,d is•
. xy i" presents the biserial coefficients corrected for attenuation on the Y variable.

These statistics, which

ranged from .559 to .816, estimate what the validity coefficients would
have been if the predictor variables were composed of continuous data and
if the test scales were error free, that is, had reliability values of
1.0^.

These values are given here because they better approximate,

Corrected split-half reliability coefficients for the three
scales, which were used to compute the
» statistics, were
taken from Edwards (1959) and equalled .60, .70, and .76 for the
Deference, Affiliation, and Succorance scales, respectively.
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in comparison to the point biserial and biserial statistics, the
predictive validity of early recollections in a clinical setting.
That is, whenever a therapist makes a prediction or otherwise comes
to some conclusion about a client on the basis of first memories,
he or she has a continuous range of options from which to choose
with respect to a given trait.

In adition, the therapist attempts

to predict directly some factor within the client, rather than an
indirect measure of it.

He or she might predict "This client is

depressed", but most probably not "This client's test results will
indicate that he is depressed".

As a result, the therapist does

not have to worry about the reliability of the variable or trait in
volved.

It should be noted, however, that in practice there is the

problem of the reliability of predictions based on early recollections.
Two experienced clinicians may come to very different conclusions on
the basis of the same memories.

Similarly, correcting for attenuation

on Y does not remove error variability due to the reliability of the
predicted scores.
The validity coefficients obtained at the two levels of re
call for the Deference and Affiliation scales are found in Tables
III and IV, respectively.

The difference between these coefficients

at the frequent and infrequent levels of recall was

nonsignificant

for both scales, although noninferentially they point in the hypo
thesized direction.
Since all data for the Succorance scale at the frequent level
of recall had High predicted scores only, it was impossible to com
pute a correlation coefficient, which left the planned procedure
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Table III:

Validity coefficients at the infrequent and frequent
levels of recall for the Deference scale.

Table IV:

Validity coefficients at the infrequent and frequent
levels of recall for the Affiliation scale.
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TABLE III

VALIDITY COEFFICIENTS AT THE INFREQUENT AND FREQUENT
LEVELS OF RECALL FOR THE DEFERENCE SCALE

Infrequent

Frequent

n

_r

n

_r

9

.309

29

.399

z = .227,

p = .97, two- tailed

TABLE IV

VALIDITY COEFFICIENTS AT THE INFREQUENT AND FREQUENT
LEVELS OF RECALL FOR THE AFFILIATION SCALE

Frequent

Infrequent

n

r_

n

r

9

.309

18

.709

z = 1.17,

p = .42, two-tailed
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useless.

As an alternative method, a two-dimensional Chi-square

test was performed in order to describe the relationship between
the correctness of High predicted scores and the frequency of recall.
The correctness variable was dichotomized as correct or incorrect
and corresponded to actual test scores of above 50 percentile points
or 50 points or less, respectively.
sented in Table V.

The Chi-square matrix is pre

The relationship between these two variables,

i.e., correctness and recall frequency, was found to correspond to a
Chi-square value of 9.91 and a phi coefficient of .585.

These statis

tics, however, cannot justifiably be subjected to an inferential
analysis with respect to Hypothesis II because the Chi-square approach
was a post hoc investigation of only a part of the data, i.e., the
predicted High scores.

Descriptively, however, one can see that pre

dicted scores based on memories of infrequent recall were typically
correct, whereas those based on recollections of frequent recall were
correct in only four out of nine instances.

Thus, the High predictions

for the Succorance scale were generally more accurate when based on
memories of infrequent, as opposed to frequent, recall.

Although this

finding is in harmony with Hypothesis II, the inferential results for
the Deference and Affiliation scales indicate that the hypothesis should
be rejected.
Tables VI and VII present the validity coefficients at the two
levels of recollection age and the results of the test on Hypothesis
III, namely, that the predictive validities of early childhood memories
and late childhood memories are not different.

The "mixed" category

is provided for descriptive purposes only and gives the correlation
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Table V

A two dimensional Chi-square matrix representing the frequency of correct and incorrect predictions at the High
level at frequent and infrequent levels of recall for the
Succorance scale.
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TABLE V

A TWO DIMENSIONAL CHI-SQUARE MATRIX REPRESENTING THE
FREQUENCY OF CORRECT AND INCORRECT PREDICTIONS AT THE HIGH
LEVEL AT FREQUENT AND INFREQUENT LEVELS OF
RECALL FOR THE SUCCORANCE SCALE

Prediction
Correct

Infrequent

Frequent
Recall
Infrequent

x

= 9.91,

= .585
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Table VI:

Validity coefficients at early, late, and mixed
of childhood recollection age for the Deference

levels
scale.

Table VII: Validity coefficients at early, late, and mixed levels
of childhood recollection age for the Affiliation scale
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TABLE VI

VALIDITY COEFFICIENTS AT EARLY, LATE, AND MIXED LEVELS
OF CHILDHOOD RECOLLECTION AGE FOR THE DEFERENCE SCALE

Late

Early

Mixed

n

r

n

r

n

r

27

.270

5

.777

6

.462

z = 1.04, p = .51, two--tailed

Table VII

VALIDITY COEFFICIENTS AT EARLY, LATE, AND MIXED LEVELS
OF CHILDHOOD RECOLLECTION AGE FOR THE AFFILIATION SCALE

Late

Early

Mixed

n

r

n

r

n

r

19

.600

7

.465

1

***

z = .338, p = .93, two-tailed
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coefficent between actual and predicted scores for predicted
scores based on recollections covering both age levels.

The ob

tained z scores were nonsignificant for the Deference and Affilia
tion scales, which thus supports Hypothesis III and indicates that
both early and late childhood recollections may be used to test
Hypotheses I and II.

An analysis of the data for the Succorance

scale was not possible because the Late category contained only two
pairs of actual and predicted scores.
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DISCUSSION

With respect to the hypothesis that early recollections may be used
as a valid measure of personality, the correlation between actual and
predicted test scores was, for one scale, found to be significantly
greater than zero at the 1% level.

That is, there is a 1% chance that

this correlation occurred on the basis of chance alone and that in
reality the population correlation coefficient is equal to zero.

Sta

tistical trends beyond the 10% level were also found for the other
two scales.
Although these results are statistically promising, the question
arises as to whether they are meaningful.

The coefficients of deter

mination, which indicate the proportion of variability in the actual
test scores accountable to the predicted scores, ranged from .13 to
.35, which is certainly not spectacular.

It should be kept in mind,

however, that these results are based on an experimental situation
quite different from the clinical setting in which early recollections
are most likely to be used.

As stated before, the biserial coefficients

corrected for attenuation on

Y

validity of first memories.

The coefficients of determination of

give a better indication of the clinical

these values ranged from .31 to .67 and thus give increased support
for the practical significance of early recollections as a personality
measure.
These findings are consistent with Adler's theory, which states
that early recollections are congruent with and reflective of the per
son's basic beliefs and attitudes:

"There are no 'chance memories':

49

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

50
out of the incalcuable number of impressions which meet an indivi
dual, he chooses to remember only those which he feels, however
darkly, to have a bearing on his situation.

Thus his memories re

present his 'Story of My Life'..." (Adler, 1931, p. 73).

However,

the correlations obtained in this study, even when corrected for
attenuation, are not of such a character to legitimize the use of
first memories as a sole indicator of personality.

Adler realized

this limitation when he noted, "Early recollections give us hints
and clues..." (1937, p. 287), but certainly not hard and fast facts.
Nonetheless, the results indicate that early recollections may be
used as a quick and practical screening device or as an effective
member of a larger battery of tests.
The hypothesis that the predictive validity of early recollections
would deteriorate under conditions of frequent recall was not given
support in the present study.

Although the data on all three scales

were descriptively consistent with the hypothesis, the inferential
findings for the Deference and Affiliation scales indicate that
the differences between the correlations at the two levels of recall
frequency may be easily explained as a matter of chance fluctuation.
The probabilities of Type I error for these two scales were 97 and
42 percent.

In addition, the results on the Succorance scale could

not, because of the nature of the method employed, properly be sub
jected to an inferential analysis.

Hypothesis II, therefore, is

rejected.
As expected, no significant difference was found between the
predictive validities of early and late childhood memories for any
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of the scales.

Thus, even though Adlerians tend to lay particular

stress upon early childhood memories, it would seem that childhood
memories in general may be used as accurate predictors of personality
variables, or at least those of a discrete kind as used in this
study.
The following summarizes the results of the present study with
respect to the three hypotheses tested:
1.

Early recollections were found to provide information
useful in the prediction of personality variables.
Correlations between actual and predicted test scores
exceeded the 10% level of significance for two scales,
and went beyond the 1% level for the third. Hypothesis
I was upheld.

2.

The predictive validity of early recollections was found
not to vary as a function of recall frequency. Hypothesis
II was rejected.

3.

The predictive validity of childhood memories was found
not to vary as a function of recollection age. Hypothesis
III was upheld.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

REFERENCES

Adler, A. Understanding Human Nature, 1927, Greenwich, Conn.:
Fawcett Publications, Inc.
Adler, A. The Science of Living, 1929, New York:

Greenberg, Inc.

Adler, A. What Life Should Mean to You, 1931, Boston:
Brown & Company.

Little,

Adler, A. Significance of early recollevtions. International
Journal of Individual Psychology, 1937, 3^, (4), 283-287.
Adler, A. The Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler, H. Ansbacher
and R. Ansbacher (Eds.), 1964, New York: Harper & Row.
Aronson, E. The Social Animal, 1972, San Francisco:
& Company.

W. H. Freeman

Bartlett, F. Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social
Psychology, 1932, London: Cambridge University Press.
Berger, P. and Luckman, T. The Social Construction of Reality,
1966, Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Company.
Bergson, H.

Matter and Memory, 1911, New York:

MacMillan Company.

Bruner, J. Perceptual theory and the Rorschach test.
Personality, 1948, 11_, 157-168.

Journal of

Bruner, J. On perceptual readiness. Psychological Review, 1957, 64,
123-152.
Bruner, J. and Goodman, C. Value and need as organizing factors in
perception. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1947,
kl_, 33-44.
Bruner, J. and Postman, L. Symbolic value as an organizing factor
in perception. Journal of Social Psychology, 1948, 27, 203-208.
Cantril, H. Perception and interpersonal relations.
of Psychiatry, 1957, 114, 119-127.
Colegrove, F. Individual memories.
1899, 10, 228-255.

American Journal

American Journal of Psychology,

Darely, J. Changes in measured attitudes and adjustments.
of Social Psychology, 1938, 9_, 189-199.

Journal

52

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

53

Dreikurs, R. The Fundamentals of Adlerian Psychology, 1950, New
York: Greenberg, Inc.
Dreikurs, R. The function of emotions. In Psychodynamics, Psycho
therapy, and Counseling, 1967, Chicago: Alfred Adler Institute,
205-217.
Durkheim, E. The Division of Labor in Society, 1964, New York:
The Free Press.
Edwards, A. Political frame of reference as a factor influencing re
cognition. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1941,
36, 34-50.
Edwards, A. Edwards Personal Preference Schedule Manual, 1959,
New York: The Psychological Corporation.
Ferguson, E. The use of early recollections for assessing life
style and diagnosing psychopathology. Journal of Projective
Techniques, 1964, 28, 403-412.
Festinger, L. A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance, 1957, Stanford,
California: Stanford University Press.
Frank, L. Projective methods for the study of personality. Journal
of Psychology, 1939, 8^, 389-413.
Frank, L. Projective Methods, 1948, Springfield, Illinois:
Charles C. Thomas.
Freud, S. A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, 1953, New
York: Pocket Books.
Freud, S. Childhood memories and screen memories. In The Complete
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, J. Strachey (Ed.), Vol. IV,
1960, London: Hogarth Press, 43-52.
Freud, S.
Books.

The Interpretation of Dreams, 1965, New York:

Avon

Friedberg, R. Early recollections of homosexuals as indicators of
their life styles. Journal of Individual Psychology, Nov. 1975,
(2), 196-204.
Garfinkel, H. Studies in Ethnomethodology, 1967, Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Hall, G. Note on early memories.
485-512.

Pedagogical Seminary, 1899, 6^,

Hastorf, A. and Cantril, H. They saw a game: A case study.
of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1954, 49^, 129-134.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Journal

54

Henri, B. and Henri, C. Earliest recollections.
Monthly, 1898, 53, 108-115.
Levy, J. and Grigg, K. Early memories.
Psychiatry, 1962, 7_, 83-94.

Popular Science

Archives of General

Lieberman, M. Childhood memories as a projective technique. Journal
of Projective Techniques and Personality Assessment, 1957, 21, 32-36.
McCarter, R., Tomkins, S., and Schiffman, H. Early recollections
as predictors of the Tomkins-Horn Picture Arrangement Test per
formance. Journal of Individual Psychology, 1961, 17, 177-180.
Miles, C. A study of individual psychology.
Psychology, 1893, 6^, 534-558.

American Journal of

Mosak, H. Early recollections as a projective technique.
of Projective Techniques, 1958, 22, 302-311.

Journal

Postman, L., Bruner, J., and McGinnies, E. Personal values as
selective factors in perception. Journal of Abnormal and Social
Psychology, 1948, 4_3, 142-154.
Vaihinger, H. The Philosohpy of 'As If1: A System of Theroretical,
Practical and Religious Fictions of Mankind, 1925, New York:
Harcourt, Brace & Company.
Watson, W. and Hartmann, G. The rigidity of a basic attitudinal
frame. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 1939, 34
314-335.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

55

APPENDIX
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Predicted test scores were made on the basis of the inter
play between the actual events of a recollection and its feeling
tone.

Both of these pieces of information were necessary for a

prediction to be made since, if one will recall from the introduction
to this paper, memory both encourages and admonishes.

The feeling

tone of a recollection thus indicates whether the memory content
portrays something desirable or undesirable.

For example, two

people may recall with similar detail receiving a spanking from
mother, but their emotional responses may indicate antithetical
tendencies.

One may recall feeling ashamed about his or her mis

deed and see the punishment as justified, while the other may remem
ber feeling resentful and picked upon.

If these recollections, as

hypothesized, reflect here and now dispositions of the two persons,
it would seem that the former is a conformist who places considera
ble stock in what authority figures say and do.

The second person,

on the other hand, presents a memory more in line with the attitude
of a rebel, someone who resists authority.
Since the Deference and Affiliation test scales relate to two
interpersonally specific attitudes, namely, toward authority figures
and friends, criteria were set up for who had to be present in an
S's early recollections for a prediction to be made.

For a predicted

score to be made on the Deference scale, the memory had to include
an adult in authority, usually a parent or grandparent.

And for

Affiliation, a nonrelative child of about the same age as the S in
the memory had to be present.

Furthermore, these figures were required

56
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Table VIII:

Early recollection content that indicates High and
Low predicted scores for the three EPPS scales.
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TABLE VIII

EARLY RECOLLECTION CONTENT THAT INDICATES HIGH AND LOW
PREDICTED SCORES FOR THE THREE EPPS SCALES

Scale

High

Low

Deference

Sees authority figures in a
favorable light; conforms to
demands or requests of author
ity figures.

Sees authority fig
ures in a dispara
ging way; rebels
against authority.

Affiliation

Sees friends and peers in a
favorable light.

Avoids freindship;
portrays friends and
peers as undesirable.

Succorance

Wants or needs help, sym
pathy, protection, etc., or
gets it without asking and
likes it.

Does not want help,
protection, sympathy,
etc., or rejects it
when offered.
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to be in roles of central importance, that is, related to the major
theme or event of the recollection.

For example, one woman in this

study began her recollection by saying, "I was walking down the
street with my mother and then we split up and I started walking
down the hill."

She went on to describe in considerable detail and

length an auto accident that she witnessed.

Although her mother was

initially present in this memory, she was not related to the primary
theme of feeling helpless in situations that call for immediate action.
Consequently, this recollection did not meet the criterion for a
prediction to be made on the Deference scale.
The Succorance scale, too, had its criterion for scoring, which
was based on what happened in the recalled event, rather than on who
was there.

That is, the person asked for, demanded, or was offered

help, care, protection, or sympathy.
In actually predicting a score, the rater had to decide whether
an S's recollection protocol indicated a high or low value placed on
authority, freindship, and succorance. Table VIII presents the basic
themes in memories that relate to High and Low predicted scores for
the three scales.
The following examples, which are taken from the present sample,
and explanations are given in order to clarify the scoring method.
Male, age 43
Recollections
1.

I was in a bad car accident with my mother. We were on our
way to pick up my brother from school and she passed out at
the wheel and hit a tree. She got cut up real bad and ended up
in the hospital and I had a broken leg from it. I remember
that I crawled on my hands and knees for about a half mile to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

a farm house we passed to get help.
I was on crutches for a while after
2.

I was really scared.
that.

Iremember going to the hospital to get my tonsils taken
out. I was really pissed off at my folks for letting the
doctor do it. I got sick and vomited all over from the
ether.

Predictions and Explanations
Deference —

Low

This predicted score is based on material in both memories.
In the first, he sees his mother as incompetent, and in
the second, he portrays both parents as unresponsive to
his needs. One also sees in his second memory an unwill
ingness to conform to his parents' expectations.
Affiliation —

No Prediction

There are no same age peers in either memory.
Succorance —

High

In the first memory, he remembers himself as being in dire
need of help. He is injured and frightened and seeks out
assistance from others.
Female, age 36
Recollections
1.

I remember when my sister was born. She's four years younger
than me so I must have been four at the time. An older
sister and brother built a snowman in front of mom's window
because she was spending a lot of time in bed resting. I guess
I was too young to understand. It's interesting that my
first memory of life would be that. I have a hurt or dislike
for my sister. We had our problems, me and Julie.

2.

I remember when my mother was nursing Julie on the front
porch of our house. It was springtime. She gave me some
pennies so I could go to the store and get some candy for
myself. I felt very pleased, like I was very big and didn't
need anyone's help. It made me feel like I wasn't the baby
of the family anymore.

3.

I remember moving into our house
until I got married. I remember
She had pigtails and was walking
my older brother and said, "Hey,

— the house I had all my life
meeting this neighbor girl.
on the railing. She saw
that guy's in my room at
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school." She was really excited that a kid in her class
lived next door to her. I guess if the same thing happened
to me, I ’d be excited too.
4.

I was playing in the parking lot next to our house and there
was this girl who's a year and a half younger than me and
she lived in this nice big house across the street. I
guess she looked out the window and saw me playing — maybe
she felt sorry for me — and she came over and we started
talking and became the best of friends. We were always to
gether up until junior high and that's when she took my boy
friend away. There's a real punchline to this story. I
found out a while after I divorced my husband that she was
seeing him on the sly while we were married. I think they
may even be married by now.

Predictions and Explanations
Deference —

Low

In Recollections 1 and 2, this woman remembers events which
signal a rather drastic shift in her position in the family.
She no longer holds down the favored position of the youngest
child, but is now just another daughter. In both memories,
she sees her mother withdrawing attention from her and giving
it to her youngest sister instead, which this woman probably
considered as unfair. The basic message is one of at least
partial rejection by the mother.
Affiliation —

Low

In Recollections 3 and 4, the basic theme is that friends do
not care about this woman. In the first, the girlfriend's
attention is quickly and easily shifted to the brother. The
second memory, especially, paints a very disparaging picture
of friendship. Her thought that the initial contact between
this woman and her friend was based on pity indicates right
away that she perceives friendship as a matter of upmanship
and competition. As a result, friends cannot be trusted, an
interpretation that is reinforced when she tied the memory
into the later events in junior high school and adulthood.
Succorance —

Low

In Recollection 2, this woman remembers undertaking a task on
her own and feeling very pleased about it.

Male, age 22
Recollections
1.

This was when my parents had a new septic tank put in.

They
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told me not to go near the hole so I just stood there and
watched as they put it in. I remember that I felt scared
about falling in.
2.

I remember when we moved out to the farm and it was a very
cold day. My parents were with me and they made me stay
in the living room because that was the warmest place in
the house. There wasn't any heat. I didn't like moving
because I had to leave all my friends.

Predictions and Explanations
Deference —

High

In both recollections, this S portrays his parents as caring
and concerned people, who take action to protect him from
danger.
Affiliation —

High

Although no friends are actually present in either memory,
Recollection 2 indicates that this man places a high value
on friendship since he felt badly about having to leave all
his friends.
Succorance —

High

In both memories, this man remembers receiving protection and
extra attention and accepting these gestures without hesita
tion.
Male, age 54
Recollections
1. This was in Oklahoma and my mom and dad were separated and my
mother took me down to my grandmother's to live. I remember
crawling along the floor and I burnt myself on this big black
stove. 1 jumped back and started hollering and my mother
came in and got me and put something on the burn — butter
or some kind of salve — to make it feel better. I knew she
was protecting me and I cuddled up into her arms until I stopped
bawling and fell asleep.
2. I remember walking down the road to school and I was throwing
rocks at a flock of geese. I would do that every day on my way
to school, but this one day they turned on me and started into
honking and pecking and flapping and chased me back home. I
ran into the house so they couldn't get me. I was scared when
they started in on me, but I felt better once I got inside
away from them.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

63
3.

I remember when I got my first bicycle. This was in Chicago
after my parents got back together. My father bought it for
me and I was riding it around the block and this bully took
it away from me. I told my dad and he went over and talked
with his father and after a few minutes my dad came back with
the bike. I was afraid the bully was going to hurt me, so
I gave him the bike. Well, really, he took it from me. I
didn't give it to him

Predictions and Explanations
Deference —

High

In Recollections 1 and 3, this man remembers his parents as
kind and helpful.
Affiliation —

Low

In Recollection 3, he remembers being taken advantage of by a
peer. Although the bully in this memory is not a friend, proper,
the recollection would seem to function to remind this person
that he must be cautious and on guard with others, an attitude
that is opposed to the basic feeling of trust necessary for
friendship.
Succorance —

High

In Recollections 1 and 3, this S is either physically or
emotionally injured and looks toward others to help him
out. Although Recollection 2 indicates that he is capable of
taking indpendent action, the general theme of the protocol
is that he will seek out others for help whenever possible.
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